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Summary
Even though financial markets today show a high degree of integration,
the world capital market is still far from the textbook capital-mobility
story. In a perfectly functioning world capital market, the efficient
international tax principle is the residence principle. In a less-than-
perfect world capital market, this principle may no longer be efficient and
the optimal tax structure may require substantial modification.
International capital immobility has been explained not only by capital
controls, but also by informational problems associated with international
investments. Because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems, real
rates of return across countries are not fully equalized. Capital market
regulations and better rules of disclosure as applied to the information
about the profitability of domestic firms alleviate some of these asymmetric
information problems. Transferring managers from the headquarters of
multinational firms to their foreign direct-investment establishments in
destination countries is a way to monitor the operation of these
establishments and thus circumvent some informational problems.
This paper highlights sources of market failure in the context of
international capital flows and provides guidelines for an efficient tax
structure in the presence of capital market imperfections. The analysis
distinguishes among foreign portfolio debt investment, foreign portfolio
equity investment, and foreign direct investment.
The paper models the risk in an economy and the asymmetry in
information between foreign investors and domestic investors. In the case
of foreign portfolio debt investment it emphasizes market failure associated
with domestic lenders being better informed than their foreign counterparts
about the creditworthiness of domestic borrowers. In the case of foreign
portfolio equity investment it emphasizes the asymmetry between domestic
investors and foreign investors, the former being better informed about the
prospective profitability of domestic firms. It views foreign direct
investment as involving the accumulation of both foreign physical capital
and managerial skills. Foreign direct investment is not merely an inflow of
capital, but an inflow of both capital and managerial inputs that
circumvents the asymmetric information problem.
The results emphasize the efficiency gains from a nonuniform treatment
of the various vehicles of international capital flows. For the three types
of capital inflow to coexist efficiently, their tax treatment cannot be
identical.

Introduction
Even though financial markets today show a high degree of integration,
with large amounts of capital flowing across international borders to take
advantage of rates of return and risk diversification benefits, the world
capital market is still far from the textbook story of perfect capital
mobility. As an example of the limited degree of capital mobility, Tesar
and Werner (1995) find that despite the recent increase in U.S. equity
investment abroad (including investments in emerging stock markets), the
U.S. portfolio remains strongly biased towards domestic equity. They report
that equity portfolio flows to West Europe, as a fraction of the value of
U.S. equity markets' capitalization, rose only from 0.3 percent in 1976 to
about 2.2 percent in 1990. The share invested in Canada remained fairly
constant, at less than 1 percent.
International capital immobility has been explained not only by
capital controls, but also by the informational problems associated with
international investments. Because of adverse selection and moral hazard
problems, real rates of return across countries are not fully
equalized. 1/ Capital market regulations and better rules of disclosure
as applied to the information about the profitability of domestic firms
alleviate some of these asymmetric information problems. The transfer
of managers from the headquarters of multinational firms to their foreign
direct investment establishments in the destination countries is one way
to monitor closely the operation of these establishments, thus
circumventing some of these informational problems.
It is well known that, in a perfectly functioning world capital market,
the efficient international tax principle is the residence principle. That
is, foreign-source and domestic-source incomes of residents are taxed at
equal rates, and nonresidents' incomes are fully tax exempt. 2/ In a
less-than-perfect world capital market, the residence principle may,
however, no longer be efficient, and the optimal tax structure may also
require substantial modifications. The purpose of this paper is to
highlight some key sources of market failure in the context of international
capital flows and to provide guidelines for efficient tax structure in the
presence of capital market imperfections.
1/ See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, Chapter 6) for a further discussion.
2/ The residence principle means that the home country does not levy
additional taxes on incomes of nonresidents over and above what they will
have to pay in their country of residence. In case the latter country
offers credits for foreign taxes (that is, for the taxes paid by these
nonresidents in the home country), then the home country will only levy a
tax on nonresidents which is equal to what they will be liable to pay
(before the credit) in their country of residence. Therefore, the "zero-
tax" reference point for nonresidents would mean "same tax" as the tax
levied on nonresidents in the country of residence.
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The failure to have a tax scheme in which the rate of returns across
countries are equated can result in inefficient capital flows across
countries. This comes from the interactions of market failure and the
tax system. For an application of the interaction between taxation and
inflation see Bayoumi and Gagnon (1996).
Bovenberg and Gordon (1993) developed a useful stylized model.of
asymmetric information between foreign and domestic investors in order to
examine principles of international taxation. They confined their analysis
mostly to foreign equity investments. In this paper we attempt to provide
a synthesis of various types of capital inflows. We distinguish among three
main types of international capital flows: foreign portfolio debt
investment (FPDI), foreign portfolio equity investment (FPEI), and foreign
direct investment (FDI).
In the case of the FPDI we emphasize market failure associated with
domestic lenders being better informed than their foreign counterparts about
the creditworthiness of domestic borrowers. Our analysis of FPDI draws on
the work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), formulated in the context of bank
lending. In the case of FPEI we follow Bovenberg and Gordon (1993) in
emphasizing asymmetric information between domestic investors and foreign
investors, the former being better informed about the prospective
profitability of domestic firms. We view foreign direct investment (FDI)
as involving accumulation of both foreign physical capital and managerial
skills. Our view is that FDI is not merely an inflow of capital, but a
tie-in inflow of capital and managerial inputs which circumvents the
asymmetric information problem.
According to Claessens (1995), portfolio flows now account for about
a third of the net resource flows to developing countries. The breakdown
between the various kinds of capital flows is given in Table 1, which shows
that although equity flows to developing countries rose fast in recent
years, they are still a much smaller fraction of the total portfolio flows
than debt instruments (bonds, certificate of deposits, and commercial
papers). There is a striking feature in this Table: FDI makes up over
half of private flows, followed by debt finance, while equity flows are
relatively unimportant. Indeed, our model suggests some reasons associated
with asymmetric information as to why this pattern might occur. This
ranking of capital inflows is consistent with the pecking order hypothesis
of corporate finance. The hypothesis maintains that firms prefer internal
finance similarly to the dominance of FDI in Table 1. If also external
finance is required then firms issue the safest security (debt) first, and
only as a last resort they issue equity. (See Myers (1984)). The advantage
of debt over equity issues is also captured in Table 1, when comparing FPDI
and FPEI.
Even though the literature has emphasized the efficiency of the
residence principle in international taxation (e.g., Frenkel, Razin, and
Sadka (1991); Gordon and Varian (1989)), our main conclusion is that it is
generally efficient to have a different tax treatment for these three types
of international capital flows. First, we show that for both FPDI and FPEI
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there may be deviations from residence-based taxation on efficiency grounds,
while efficient taxation of FDI is compatible with the residence principle.
Second, while in the case of FPEI it is efficient to subsidize nonresidents
on their investments and tax domestic corporate income (as shown by
Bovenberg and Gordon (1993)), in the case of FPDI it is still efficient to
grant nonresidents a favorable tax treatment over residents, but not
necessarily to actually subsidize foreign investment. In the latter case
it remains efficient to tax domestic corporate income, and interest income
of residents.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II develops the
analytical methodology employed in this paper. The framework is applied
to FPDI. The other kind of portfolio flow, FPEI, analyzed by Bovenberg and
Gordon (1993), is recast in the framework of our analytical methodology in
Section III. In Section IV we look at FDI and in Section V we provide
concluding remarks.
II. Foreign Portfolio Debt Investment (FPDI)
Throughout this paper we assume a small, capital-importing country,
referred to as the home country. In this section we assume that capital
imports are channelled solely through borrowing by domestic firms from
foreign banks and other lenders. The economy is small enough that, in the
absence of any government intervention, it faces a perfectly elastic supply
of external funds at a given risk-free world rate of interest, r* . However,
as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), a firm may choose to default on its debt
if its future cash flow falls short of its accumulated debt. Therefore,
foreign lenders may charge ex-ante a higher rate of interest for domestic
borrowers than for foreign borrowers.
In the planning stage of the first period the firms commit their
investment but the actual investment and its funding is delayed to the
implementation stage in the first period. 1/ We follow Bovenberg and
Gordon (1993) in modelling the risk in this economy and the asymmetry in
information between foreign investors and domestic investors. Consider a
two-period model with a very large number (N) of ex-ante identical domestic
firms. Each firm employs capital input (K) in the first period in order
to produce a single composite good in the second period. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that capital depreciates fully at the end of the
production process in the second period. Gross output in the second period
is equal to F(K)(1 + E), where F is a production function exhibiting
diminishing marginal productivity of capital and £ is a random productivity
factor. The latter has zero mean and is independent across all firms.
(E is bounded from below by -1, so that output is always nonnegative.)
Given the very large size of N and the independence of c across firms, we
assume that consumers-investors behave in a risk-neutral way.
1/ This is a simple way to represent asymmetric information for lenders
in a general equilibrium model.
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We follow Bovenberg and Gordon (1993) in assuming that firms make their
investment decisions before the state of the world (that is, z) is known.
Thus, since all firms face the same probability distribution of £, they all
choose the same level of investment (K). They then issue debt, either at
home or abroad, to finance the investment. At this stage, domestic lenders
are better informed than foreign lenders. There are many ways to specify
the degree of this asymmetry in information. However, in order to
facilitate the analysis, we simply assume that domestic lending
institutions, being "close to the action," observe £ before they make their
loan decisions, but foreign lending institutions, being "far away from the
action" do not.
Throughout this paper we consider three tax instruments: a tax on
capital income of nonresidents (at rate r*), a tax on capital income of
residents (at rate r), and a corporate income tax (at rate 8). However,
with debt financing a corporate tax is essentially a tax on pure profits
(rents) and therefore it does not affect corporate behavior (see
Appendix I, (A)). Thus, for notational simplicity, we set 0 equal zero
in this section; in practice the neutrality of this tax in the presence
of debt finance makes it efficient to set it at a high rate.
Competition among the borrowing firms and among the lending
institutions, both domestic and foreign, ensures that there will be a
unique interest rate charged to all the domestic borrowing firms. Denote
this domestic interest rate by r. Given its investment decision (K), a
firm will default on its debt if the realization of its random productivity
factor is low so that its output F(K)(1 + e) is smaller than its accumulated
debt K(1+r). Thus, there is a cut-off value of £o, such that all firms
which realize a value of £ below £o default and all other firms (that is,
firms with £ > £o) fully repay their debts. This cut-off level of £ is
defined by
F(K)(1 + £o) = (1 + r)K . (1)
Denote the cumulative probability distribution of £ by o. Then, No(£o)
firms default on their debt while the other N[1-o(£o)] firms remain solvent.
Recall that domestic lenders observe the value of £ before making their
loan decisions. Therefore, they will not lend money to a firm that realized
a value of E lower than £o. But foreign lenders do not observe £, so that
they will advance loans to all firms, since they all look identical to them.
Thus, foreign lenders will give loans to all the No(£o) would-be bankrupt
firms and to some fraction (say, ß) of the N[1-o(£o)] would-be solvent
firms. (The other fraction, 1 - ß, of the would-be solvent firms is
financed by domestic lenders). Foreign lenders therefore receive a total of
ßN[1-o(£o)]K(1 + r) from the solvent firms. Each bankrupt firm can pay back
only its gross output, that is F(K)(l+£). Thus, foreign lenders receive a
total of No(£o)F(K)(1 + e-) from the bankrupt firms, where e- is the mean
value of £ realized by the bankrupt firms:
e- = E(£/ £< £ o ) , (2)
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that is, e- is the conditional expectation of e, given that c < eo. For
later use we also define by e + the conditional expectation of e, given that
e>eo:
e + - E(e/ e>eo) (3)
and we note that the weighted average of e- and e + must yield the average
value of £ that is:
o(eo)e- + [1 - o(eo)]e+ = E(e) = 0 . (4)
The latter equation also implies that e- < 0 while e + > 0, that is:
the expected value of t for the "bad" ("good") firm is negative (positive).
Altogether, foreign lenders receive the sum of
A = ßN[1 - o(£o)]K(1 + r) + No(eo)F(K)(l + e-) (5)
before domestic taxes, on their total loans (Foreign Portfolio Debt
Investment-FPDI) of
FPDI = ßN[1 - o(eo)]K + No(£O)K, (6)
made to domestic firms. They thus accumulate a capital income that equals
A - FPDI, which is subject to domestic taxation at the rate of r* . Net of
tax, their FPDI yields A - r*(A - FPDI). This amount must be equal to
FPDI(1 + r*), as foreign lenders can earn a return of r* in their home
countries. Thus, we conclude that
FPDI[l + r*/(1 - r*)] = A. (7)
The rationale for the latter equality is straightforward: foreign lenders
must earn a before-tax rate of return of r*/(l - r*) on their FPDI so that
their after-tax rate of return remains r* , the rate of return they can earn
in their home countries. Thus, the tax that our small economy imposes on
their capital income is fully shifted to domestic borrowers. Substituting
for the values of A and FPDI from (5) and (6), equation (7) becomes:
{ßN[1 - o(eo)]K + No(£O)K}[1 + r*/(l - r*)]
= ßN[1 - o(eo)]K(l + r) + No(eo)F(K)(l + e-) . (8)
Let us now examine the debt-financed investment decision of a
representative firm. This firm invests K in the first period and expects to
receive a gross output of E[F(K)(1 + £ ) ] = F(K) in the second period. It
also knows that if e turns out to be smaller than £o, it will default on its
debt. This firm expects then to pay back its accumulated debt, that is
K(l + r) , with probability 1 - o(eo). It expects to default, paying only
F(K)(1 + e-) , with probability o(eo). Thus, the expected value of its cash
receipts in the second period are
F(K) - [1 - o(eo)]K(1 + r) - o(£O)F(K)<1 + e-) . (9a)
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Maximizing the latter expression with respect to K yields the following
first-order condition:
[1-o(eo)](1+r)F ' ( K ) = i yV oJ1K 1 . (9)
Note that since 1 + e- < 1, it follows that
F'(K) < 1 + r . (10)
Knowing that in "bad" realizations of c (when e < eo) it will not fully
repay its loan, the firm invests beyond the level where the unconditional
expected net marginal productivity of capital (namely, F'(K) -1) is just
equal to the interest rate (namely, r). Note that, unlike with FPEI
discussed in the next section, we cannot assert here that
F'>1+ r*/(l - r*). However, as expected, because of the default
possibility, foreign lenders charge an ex-ante interest (namely, r) which
is higher than what they will be satisfied with (namely, r*/(l. - r*)), given
that the alternative return at home is r*. This difference is a reflection
of the risk premium. 1/
We abstract from income-distributional equity considerations,
implicitly assuming that the government can optimally redistribute income
via lump-sum transfers a la Samuelson (1956). This means that with no loss
of generality we may assume that there is one representative individual-
consumer in the economy. She has an initial endowment of I1 in the first
period and I2 in the second period. She consumes c1 in the first period and
C2 in the second period. Her saving earns an after-tax rate of return of
(1 - r)r, so that her net discount factor is equal to 2/
q = [1 + (1 - r)r] - 1 or r - (rq - 1 + q)/rq . (11)
We denote her net wealth (that is the present value of her after-tax life-
time income) by W. As we assume that the government can levy lump-sum
taxes, it essentially controls W. The consumer budget constraint is given
1/ More specifically, one can show (by substituting (1) and (8) into (9))
that [1+r*/(l-r*)]/(l+r) - a•*1+(l-a)•(l+e-)(l+eo)-l, where a -ß[1-
o(eo)]/{o(eo + ß[1 -o(eo)]}. Thus, 1 + r*/(1 - r*)](l + r) is a weighted
average of 1 and (l+e-)/(l + e o). Since (l+e-)/(l + eo) < 1, it follows that
1 + r*/(l - T*) < 1 + r. This implies that r*/(l - r*) < r. For a related
analysis of the interactions between optimal taxation of foreign investment
and sovereign debt, see Eaton and Gersovitz (1989).
2/ Her saving is either deposited with domestic intermediaries (banks,
etc.) that channel it to the firms or in government's bonds that also yield
before-tax rate of return of r. Assuming, as we are, that the government
can levy lump-sum taxes in each period to balance its budget makes these
bonds superfluous.
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by c1 + qc2 = W. The maximization of her utility subject to this constraint
gives rise to an indirect utility function, v(W,q), and consumption demand
functions, c1(W,q) and c2(W,q), in the first and second period,
respectively.
In the first period the economy faces a resource constraint, stating
that FPDI must suffice to cover the difference between domestic investment
(namely, NK) and national savings (namely, I1 - c1(W,q) - G1, where G1 is
public consumption):
FPDI = NK - [I1 - c1(W,q) - G 1 ] . (12)
No matter what taxes are levied by the home country on FPDI, foreigners will
be able to extract from the home country an amount of 1+r* units of output
in the second period for each unit that they invest in the first period.
Therefore, the home country faces the following second-period budget
constraint: 1/
NF(K) - (1 + r*)FFDI + I2 = c2(W,q) + G2. (13a)
That is, gross national output (namely, NF(K) - (1 + r*)FPDI) and the
initial endowment (namely, I2) must suffice to support private consumption
(c2) and public consumption (G2). Employing (12), one can rewrite (13a) in
present value terms as
I1 + I2/(1+r*) + NF(K)/(1 + r*)=
c1(W,q) + c2(W,q)/(1 + r*) + G1 + G2/(l + r*) + NK . (13)
We are now in a position to formulate an optimal tax policy for the
government. Since we concentrate on tax policy, we may consider the public
expenditure variables (namely, G1 and G2) as exogenous, with no loss of
generality. (This means that our results are valid whether or not the
government expenditure policy is optimal.) The aim of our benevolent
government is to maximize the utility v(W,q) of the representative
individual. There are nine endogenous variables: K, r, eo, ß, r*, r, q, W,
and FPDI. There are also seven constraints that combine real resource
constraints (namely, (12) and (13)), market equilibrium constraints
(namely, (1), (6), and (8)), an optimizing-agent behavioral constraint
(namely, (9)), and a definition of the consumer's discount factor
(namely, (11)).
However, it turns out that the optimal policy problem can be simplified
a great deal. To accomplish this, notice that the objective function
(namely, v(W,q)) and the present-value resource constraint (namely, (13))
contain only three endogenous (control) variables--W, q, and K. Thus, we
can first choose these three variables so as to maximize the individual
utility function, subject to the present-value resource constraint (13).
1/ Note that the expected value of output is E[NF(K)(1+e)] - NF(K), since
E(e) = 0.
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The Lagrangian expression for this optimization problem is
L = v(W, q) + X [I1 + I2/(1 + r*> + NF(K)/(1 + r*)
- c1(W,q) - c2( W,q)/(1 + r*) - G1 - G2/l + r*) - NK], (14)
where A > 0 is a Lagranage multiplier. Having solved for the optimal values
of W, q and K, we can then employ the remaining six constraints-- (1) , (6),
(8), (9), (11), and (12)--in order to solve for the optimal values of the
remaining six control variables - r, eo, ß, r*, r and FPDI.
There are three main policy conclusions that we wish to emphasize here.
First, the optimal level of investment is such that the expected net
marginal product of capital (that is, F'(K) - 1) is equal to the world rate
of interest (that is, r*):
F'(K) = 1 + r* . (15)
(Note that it then follows from (10) that r>r*; that is, the domestic rate
of interest stays above the world rate of interest). Equation (15) is
essentially a corollary of the familiar aggregate production efficiency
theorem of welfare economics: a small open economy should equate all of
its marginal rates of transformation to the corresponding world prices.
In our case there is only one marginal rate of transformation (namely the
intertemporal rate F'(K)), and the corresponding world price is 1 + r* .
The proof of (15) follows immediately upon differentiating L in (14) with
respect to K and setting the derivative equal to zero.
Second, the optimal policy calls for a tax on capital income of
residents, that is r > 0. To prove this, observe that with the availability
of lump-sum, nondistortionary taxes, it is optimal to follow the Pareto-
efficiency rule of equating the marginal rate of substitution between
present and future consumption (namely, q-1) to the gross marginal product
of capital (namely, F'(K) = 1 + r*):
q-1 = 1 + r* ; (16)
which implies that:
because r* < r.
1 + (1 - r)r = 1 + r*
r = 1 - r*/r > 0 , (17)
see also (Appendix I, (B)), for a formal proof. Substituting q-l = 1 + r*
into equation (11) yields
- 10 -
Third, the rate of tax on capital income of nonresidents (namely, r*)
must be lower than the rate of tax on residents' capital income (namely, r).
To prove this, substitute (1) into (8) to get:
{ßN[1-o(£o)]K + No(£o)K}[1 + r*/(1 - r*)]
= ßN[1 - o(eo)]K(l + r) + No(£o)K(l + r)(l + e-)(l + eo)-1 .
Rearranging terms yields
1+r*/(1-r*) = ß[l-o(£o)]+o(eo)(1+e-)/(1+e0)<1
because e- < £Q. This implies that
r* < 1 - r*/r = r , (18)
by (17). In fact, r* may even be negative. It is worth emphasizing that
the two tax instruments (r and r*) support a first-best allocation.
The rationale for the optimal tax policy (namely, r > 0, and r* < r)
is quite straightforward. First, given the possibility of default, in which
case firms do not fully repay their loans, they tend to overinvest relative
to the domestic interest rate that they face: the expected net marginal
product of capital (namely, F'(K) - 1) is driven below the domestic rate of
interest (namely, r); see condition (10). In order to ensure that firms do
not drive their expected net marginal product of capital below the world
rate of interest (r*), the government must positively tax domestic interest
so as to maintain the domestic rate of interest above the world rate of
interest. Second, any tax levied on foreign lenders must be shifted fully
to domestic borrowers, by the small country assumption. Therefore, foreign
lenders must earn an expected return of r*/(l - r* ) on their loans. Since
in the case of default they are unable to recoup all of the interest, they
must initially charge domestic borrowers a higher rate of interest than r* /
(1 - r*). Therefore, the domestic rate of interest (r) which is charged by
all lenders, both foreign and domestic ones, must be higher than
r*/(l - r*), that is r > r*/(1 - r*), or r(1 - r*) > r*. This means that if
the nonresident tax rate (r*) were to be applied to residents their net of
tax interest rate (namely, (1 - r*)r) would have been higher than the world
rate of interest (namely, r*). But, actually Pareto-efficiency requires
that the net of tax domestic interest rate (namely, (1 - r)r) will be equal
to the world rate of interest. Therefore, residents must be levied a higher
tax rate on their capital income than nonresidents.
III. Foreign Portfolio Equity Investment (FPEI)
In this section we assume that capital flows are channeled solely
through portfolio equity investment, FPEI. Officially, foreign portfolio
equity investment is defined as buying less than a certain small fraction
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(10-20 percent) of shares of a firm. However, from an economic point of
view the critical feature of FPEI is the lack of control of the foreign
investor over the management of the domestic firm, because of the absence
of foreign managerial inputs. Therefore, for our purposes, we shall simply
assume that foreign investors buy shares in existing firms without
exercising any form of control or applying its own managerial inputs.
This is also why we assume, in complete analogy to the information
asymmetry assumed in the model of FPDI, that foreign investors do not
observe the actual value of £ when they purchase shares in existing firms.
Domestic investors, on the other hand, do observe the value of e at this
stage. As before, we continue to assume that e is not known to the firm or
to anyone else when the capital investments are made.
This is precisely the model which was developed by Bovenberg and
Gordon (1993). For the sake of completeness, we employ the analytical
apparatus that we developed in the preceding section in order to derive
optimal policy prescriptions in this case. These policy prescriptions are
different than those obtained in the preceding section, in the case of FPDI.
As before, in the first period all firms choose the same level of K,
since e is unknown to them at this stage. All firms are originally owned
by domestic investors who equity-finance their capital investment K. After
these capital investments were made, the value of £ is revealed to domestic
investors but not to foreign investors. The latter buy shares in the
existing firms at a total amount of FPEI. They expect their investment to
appreciate in the second period to an amount of FPEI [1 + r*/(l-r*)], as the
capital gains are taxed at the rate of r*, and foreign investors must earn
a net-of-tax rate of return of r*, which is the alternative rate of return
they can earn when they invest at their home countries.
Being unable to observe £, foreign investors will offer the same price
for all firms reflecting the average productivity for the group of low
productivity firms they purchase. On the other hand, domestic investors
who do observe £, will not be willing to sell at this price the firms which
experienced high values of £ (or, equivalently, domestic investors will
outbid foreign investors for these firms). Therefore, as before, there will
be a cutoff level of £, say co (possibly different than the one under FPDI),
such that all firms which experience a lower value of £ than the cutoff
level will be purchased by foreigners; all other firms will be maintained
by domestic investors. The cutoff level of £ is then defined by
[(1 - 0)F(K)(1 + e-)]/[l + r*/(1 - r*)]
= [(1 - 0)F(K)(1 + £o)]/[l + (1 - r)r] . (19)
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The value of a firm in the second period is equal to its gross output, minus
corporate profit taxes, that is: (1 - 0)F(K)(1 + c). 1/ Because foreign
equity investors buy only the firms with e< eo, the expected second-period
value of a firm they buy is only (1 - 0)F(K)(1 + e-), which they then
discount by the factor 1 + r*/(l - r*) to determine the price they are
willing to pay for it in the first period. At equilibrium, this price is
equal to the price that a domestic investor is willing to pay for the firm
which experiences a value of eo for its productivity factor £. The cutoff
price is equal to the output of the firm, minus corporate profit taxes,
discounted at the rate of (1-r)r, which is the rate that domestic investors
can earn on domestic government bonds. 2/ This explains the equilibrium
condition (19). Rearranging terms, equation (19) reduces to:
(1 + e-)/[1 + r*/(1 - r*)] = (1 + eo)/[1 + (1 - r] • (1')
Note that since l + e- < l + £ o,it follows that an equilibrium with
both foreigners and residents having nonzero holdings in domestic firms
requires that the foreigners' net of tax rate of return, namely r*/(l - r*),
is lower than the residents' net of tax rate of return, namely r(l - r). In
some sense this means that foreign investors are overcharged for their
purchases of domestic firms. They outbid domestic investors that are
willing to pay, on average, only a price of (1 - 0)F(K)(1 + e -)/
[1+ (1 - r)r] for the low productivity firms.
Since there are o(£o)N firms purchased by foreign investors, it follows
that:
FPEI = [o(eo)N<1 - 0)F(K)(1 + e-)]/[1 + r*/(1 - r*)] . (6')
Consider now the capital investment decision of the firm that is made
before £ becomes known. The firm seeks to maximize its market value, net of
the original investment (K). Since with a probability o(co) it will be sold
to foreign investors, who pay (1-0)F(K)(1 + e-)/[1 + r*/(l - r*)], and with
a probability [1-o(eo)] it will be sold to domestic investors, who pay on
average (1 - 0)F(K)(1 + e+)/[l + (1 - r)r], the firm's expected market
value, net of the original capital investment, is
1/ Strictly speaking, the corporate tax rate (0) applies to profits,
F(K) - K, that is output minus depreciation, and not to output, F(K).
However, there is a one-to-one relationship between the tax base F(K) - K
and the tax base F(K). We therefore follow Bovenberg and Gordon (1993) in
levying a tax at a rate 0 on output, F(K) , which simplifies the notation a
great deal.
2/ Here again government bonds are superfluous, but we maintain them in
order to establish a possibility for the consumer to lend money and assign
some meaningful value for a net-of-tax domestic interest rate, namely (1 -
r)r.
- K + o(£o)(1 - 0)F(K)(1 + e-)/[1 + r*/(1 - r*)]
+ [1 - o(£o)](1 - 0)F(K)(1 + e+)/[1 + (1 - r)r] . (9a')
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Maximizing this expression with respect to K yields the following necessary
and sufficient first-order condition:
o(£o>(1 - 0)F'(K)(1 + e-)/[1 + r*/(l " r*)]
+ [1 - o(eo)](1 - 0)F'(K)(1 + e+)/[1 + (1 - r)r] = 1 . (9')
As expected, and as can be immediately seen form equation (9'), the
corporate tax in this equity-finance case, unlike the debt-finance case of
the preceding section, does affect firm's behavior. Since the firm knows,
when making its capital investment decision, that it will be sold to foreign
investors at an "overcharged" price in low-productivity events, it tends to
overinvest relative to the net of tax rate of return to domestic investors
and underinvest relative to the net of tax rate of return to foreign
investors:
1 + r*/(1 - r*> < (1 - 0)F'(K) < 1 + (1 - r)r. (10')
(A formal proof of these inequalities is provided in Appendix I, (C))
The remaining equations of the FPEI model are essentially similar to
those of the FPDI model in the preceding section. Equation (11) which
defines the consumer's discount factor stays intact. In equation (12) we
have to replace FPDI by FPEI. Accordingly,
FPEI = NK - [I1 - c1(W,q) - G1] . (12')
Equation (13), the present-value resource constraint remains unchanged.
The public finance objective is again to maximize v(W,q), subject to
six constraints: (1'), (6'), (9'), (11), (12'), and (13). There are nine
control (endogenous) variables: K, r,. eo r*, r, 9, q, W, and FPEI. Note
that we have the same number of variables as before, but one fewer
constraint. This is not surprising because r and r cannot be uniquely
determined since the only lending/borrowing activity here is carried out
between the government and the (homogenous) household sector; therefore it
only matters what is the net of tax rate of interest, that is (1 - O r , and
not r and r separately. We apply now similar analytical procedure as in
the preceding section.
The optimal policy prescriptions are as follows 1/:
First, as in the FPDI case, the expected net (of depreciation) marginal
product of capital (namely, F'(K) - 1) must be equated to the world rate of
interest (namely, r*):
F'(K) = 1 + r* . (15)
1/ These are precisely the policy prescriptions derived by Bovenberg and
Gordon(1993).
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This means, that capital investment per firm is identical in the two cases
(FPDI and FPEI).
Second, the optimal policy calls for a subsidy to foreign investment,
that is:
r* < 0 . (18')
To see this, observe first that, as in the preceding section, one can show
that 1 + (1 - r)r = 1 + r* (equation (16)). Substituting this equality into
(10') yields 1 + r*/(l - r*) < 1 + r*, which implies (18').
Third, it is optimal to levy a positive tax on corporate income, that
is:
0 > 0 . (20)
To see this, substitute (15) and (16) into (10') to get (1 - 0)(1 + r*) < 1
+ r*, which implies that 0 > 0.
Indeed, by using the optimal tax instruments, we obtain again the
first-best allocation, as in the preceding section. Thus, the volume of
optimal foreign investment is identical in both cases: FPDI = FPEI. The
difference is in the mix of policy tools: (i) In the debt-flow case the
corporate income tax (8) is a neutral tax, that could be set at any
(arbitrarily high) level. In the equity-flow case we found a well-defined
tax 0 > 0. (ii) In the debt-flow case, we find that the capital income of
residents must be positively taxed (that is r > 0). In the equity-flow
case, r is irrelevant. (iii) In the debt-flow case, we found that the tax
on capital income of nonresidents (r*) must be lower than the corresponding
tax on residents (r), that is r* < r. In the equity-flow case, we find that
foreign investment must be actually subsidized, that is r* < 0, while r is
irrelevant.
In concluding the discussion of the two indirect flows of capital we
emphasize that the real system with fixed corporate, domestic, and foreign
investment tax rates fits closely the first-best equilibrium, that is
achieved in the full information set up.
IV. Foreign Direct Investment (FDD
In this section we consider international capital flows in the form of
foreign direct investment (FDI). In a formal sense a foreign acquisition of
shares in domestic firms is classified as a direct foreign investment when
the shares acquired exceed a certain fraction of ownership (10-20 percent).
From an economic point of view we look at FDI not just as a purchase of a
sizable share in a company but, more importantly, as an actual exercise of
control and management. We thus view FDI as a tie-in activity, involving an
inflow of both capital and managerial inputs.
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This combination of inputs accords foreign investors with the same kind
of "home-court" advantage (with respect to, say, business information) that
domestic investors have, but foreign portfolio (debt and equity) investors
lack. Specifically, foreign direct investors learn about the state of the
world (i.e., the realization of the productivity factor e) at the same stage
as domestic investors. The asymmetric information feature of the two
preceding sections is thus circumvented by FDI.
A foreign direct investor purchases a domestic company from scratch,
at the "greenfield" stage; that is, before any capital investment has been
made. In fact, the foreign direct investor makes the capital investment
decision herself and imports a bundle of inputs, K* and M*, where K* is
capital input and M* is a managerial input. Gross output in the second
period is (1 + M*)yF(K*)(1 + e) , where 0 < y < 1. If J firms are purchased
by the foreign direct investors, for a price of V per firm, then the total
volume of FDI is given by
FDI = J(K* + V) . (21)
(Recall that foreign direct investors bring to the firm which they purchase
their own capital input K*.)
Gross output of a domestically owned firm, which invests a capital
input of K, is still only F(K)(1 + e). As foreign investors and domestic
investors are equally informed, the expected value of £ is equal for both
investors, that is zero.
If a firm is sold to foreign direct investors, its expected second-
period cash receipts, net of corporate taxes, is 1/
(1 - 0)[(1 + M*)yF(K*) - M*w*M/(1 * r*M)]
which is worth to the foreign investors only
(1 - 0)[(1+ M*)yF(K*) - M*w*M/(1 - r*M)]/[1 + r*/(l - r*)]
in the first period, where w*M is the world wage of managerial inputs and
r*M is the tax rate levied by the home country on nonresident managers.
(Notice that the tax r*M levied by the small home country on nonresident
managers is again shifted fully back to itself). Subtracting from the last
expression the original capital investment yields:
V = - K* + (1 - 0)[(1 + M*)YF(K) - M*w*M/(1 - r*M)]/[1 + r*/d - r*)] , (22)
as the market value of a firm purchased by foreign direct investors.
1/ We continue to ignore depreciation in calculating the corporate tax
base with no loss of generality.
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Similarly,
- K + (1 - 0)F(K)/[1 + (1 - r)r] (23)
is the market value of a domestically owned firm. Thus, a firm is sold to
foreign direct investors if equations (22) exceeds (23) (when K*, M* and
K are optimally chosen). At an equilibrium with a positive number of firms
owned by both types of investors, we must therefore have equality between
equations (22) and (23), that is:
- K* + (1 - 0) [(1 + M*)y F(K*) - M*w*M /
(1 - r*M)]/[1 + r*/(1-r*)] (1")
= - K + (1 - 0)F(K)/[1 + (1 - r)r] .
Optimizing behavior on the part of all firms (i.e., maximization of
equation (22) with respect to K* and K* and maximization of equation (23)
with respect to K) yields
(1 + M*)YF'(K*) = 1 + r*/(1 - f*) , (9"a)
y(1 + M*)yF(K*) + w*M/(1 - r*M) , (9"b)
and
(1 - 0)F'(K) = 1 + (1 - r)r, (9"c)
where f* is the total effective tax rate levied by the home country on
capital income of nonresidents at both the corporate and individual levels,
and is defined implicitly by:
1 + r*/(1 - f*) = [1 + r*/(1 - r*)]/(l - 0).
The optimal fiscal policy conclusions in this case of fully symmetric
information are quite straightforward (formal proofs are relegated to
Appendix I, (D)).
First, it will be still efficient to follow the aggregate production
efficiently rule which requires that
and that
(1 + M*)YF'(K*) = 1 + r* , (15"a)
Y(1 + M*)Y-1F(K*) - w*M .
Comparing equations (15"a) to (9"a) and (15"b) to (9"b) implies that
nonresident's incomes should not be taxed, that is:
r* - r*M = 0 . (24)
Thus, the residence principle of international taxation should be followed
in this case. Foreign direct investment, which circumvents the asymmetric
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information distortion, restores the efficiency of the residence-based
taxation on international flows of factors of production; see Frenkel,
Razin, and Sadka (1991). 1/
Note also that aggregate production efficiency requires that the net of
depreciation marginal product of capital of the non-FDI domestic firm
(namely, F'(K) - 1) should be equal to the world rate of interest (namely,
r*) that is
F'(K) = 1 + r* . (15"c)
Comparing equations (15"a) to (15"c) implies that due to the foreign
advantage afforded by foreign managerial inputs, the firm owned by the
foreign direct investor finds it profitable to carry larger capital
investments than the domestically-owned firm, that is K* > K. Also,
comparing equations (15"c) to (9"c) implies that domestic tax rates must be
set in such a way so as to satisfy:
[1 + (1 - r)r]/(l - 0) = 1 + r* . (25)
That is, there should be no tax distortions on corporate profits of non-FDI
firms. (Recall from equation (9"c) that the term on the left-hand side of
equation (25) is the corporate return factor, net of all taxes, both at the
individual level and the corporate level.)
In addition, aggregate production efficiency requires that the number
of the firms sold to the foreign direct investors is such that the net
economic value of a firm at the hands of foreign direct investors must be
equal to the net economic value of a firm remaining with domestic control
and management, that is:
Indeed, when the residence principle of international taxation is fulfilled
and the domestic tax rates are set as in equation (25), then condition in
equation (26) must also be satisfied. This can be seen by substituting the
optimal tax rules equations (24) and (25) into (1") and comparing the
outcome to equation (26). (Recall also that 1 + r*/(1 - f*) = [1 + r*/
(1 - r*)]/(l - 0).)
1/ It is worth emphasizing that this strong result of no taxation of
nonresidents' income holds whether or not the government can levy lump-sum
taxes or transfers, that is whether or not a first-best allocation is
attained. Thus, even when the government must resort to distortionary
taxation on residents' incomes (namely, r > 0) in order to meet its revenue
needs, it will still be efficient to exempt nonresidents.
(1+M*)YF(K*)- W*M M*
- K*= F(K)/(1+r*) - K . (26)
1+r*
- 18 -
V. Conclusion
The main policy conclusions are summarized in Table 2. The table
emphasizes the efficiency of a nonuniform treatment of the various vehicles
of international capital flows. In order for the three kinds of capital
inflows to efficiently co-exist, their tax treatment cannot be identical.
Our model gives predictions in line with the pecking order story of
corporate finance. Recall that the finance pecking order is: (1) Firms
prefer internal finance (the analogue of FDI). (2) If external finance is
required, firms issue the safest sercurity first; that is they start with
debt (the analogue of FPDI). (3) Equity issue (the analogue of FPEI) is
used as a last resort. Work in finance based on asymmetric information
yield propositions roughly consistent with this story (see Myers (1984)).
One issue, which has not been dealt with in the paper is the existence
of insured domestic financial intermediaries, as in the case of the central
bank (or the government) bailing out troubled commercial banks and savings
and loans institutions. If these intermediaries are not excluded from
international transactions, there is the possibility that the essentially
domestic moral hazard problem will also plague international capital
inflows. This problem calls, however, for applying different policy
instruments than the ones analyzed in this paper.
Type of Tax Type of Foreign Investment
- 19 -
Table 2. Tax Treatment of Foreign Investment
Corporate tax
(0)
Tax on Capital
Income of
Residents (r)
Tax on Capital
Income of
Nonresidents
(r* or r*)
Foreign Portfolio
Debt Investment
High
Positive
Lower than on
residents
Foreign Portfolio
Equity Investment
Positive
Irrelevant
Negative
Foreign Direct
Investment
Depends on
government
revenue needs
Depends on
government
revenue needs
Zero
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Derivations
A. Expression (9a) describes the expected (second-period) cash receipts of
the firm before any corporate taxes. If a corporate tax 0 is levied on the
firm, and assuming full loss offset, the expected tax liability will be:
0{F(K) - K - [1 - o(£0)]Kr
- o(£O)[F(K)(1 + e-) - K]} . (Al)
The tax is levied on net output (i.e., F(K) - K, allowing for depreciation),
minus interest expenses which are either Kr with probability [1 - o(€o)] in
the no-default case or F(K)(1 + e-) - K with probability o(eo) in the
default case. Subtracting (Al) from (9a) yields the net-of-tax expected
cash receipts of the firms:
(1 - 0)(F(K) - [1 - *(£O)]K(1 + r) - 0(£O)F(K)(1 + e-)} . (A2)
Since the after-tax objective function of the firm (namely, (A2)) differs
from its pre-tax objective function (namely, (9a)) only by a multiplicative
factor (namely, 1 - 0), it follows that, with a full loss offset, the tax
has no effect on the firm's behavior.
B. Differentiate L (equation (14)) with respect to W and q, to get:
v1 - Ac11 - Ac21/(1 + r*) = 0 , (A3)
and
v 2 - Ac 1 2 - Ac22/(1 + r*> = 0 , (A4)
where v1 = av/aW, v 2 = av/aq, c11 - ac1/aW, c 1 2 = ac1/aq, c 2 1 = ac2/aW,
and c22 = ac2/aq. Substituting Roy's identity
v 2 = -c2 v1 (A5)
and the Hicks-Slutsky equations
c i 2 = c i 2 - c2ci1 i = 1, 2 (A6)
where ci2 is the Hicks-compensated derivative of ci with respect to q, into
(A4) yields
-c2[v1 - Acx11 - Ac21/(1 + r*)
- Ac12 - Ac22/d + r*) = 0 . (A7)
Substitute (A3) into (A7) to get
c21 + c22 /(1 + r*) = 0 , (A8)
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where use is made of the symmetry of the Hicks-substitution effects:
c
12 =
 c
12. Substituting the Euler's equation,
c 2 1 + qc2i = 0 , (A9)
into (A8) implies q-1 = 1 + r*.
C. Substitute for (1 + e-)[l + r*/(1 - r*)] from (1') into (9') and
rearrange terms to get:
0(£o)(l - 0)F'(K)(1 + £o)
+ [1 - O(£0)](l - 0)F'(K)(1 + e+) = 1 + (1 - r)r . (A10)
Since 1 + £o > 1 + e-, it follows from (A10) that
1 + (1 - r)r > (1 - 0)F'(K){o(£O)(1 + e-) + [1 - o (£0)](l + e+)}
= (1 - 0)F'(K) ,
because the term in the curly brackets is equal to one (see equation (4)).
This proves the inequality in the right end of (10'). Substitute for 1 +
(1 - r)r from (1') into (9') and rearrange terms to get:
o<£d.)(l - 0)F'(K)(1 + e-) + [1 - o(E O)](1 - 0)F'(K)
(1 + e+)(l + e-)(l + C o ) - 1 = 1 + r*/(1 - r*) . (All)
Since (1 + e-) (1 + eO)-1 < 1, it follows from (All) that
1 + r*/(l - r*) < (1 - e)F'(K){o(€o)(l + e-) + [1 - o(eo)](l + e+)}
= (1 - 0)F'(K),
which completes the proof of (10')
D. The objective of the government is to choose K, K*, M*, q, W, and J so
as to maximize v(W,q), subject to the present-value resource constraint:
I1 + I2/(1 + r*) + (N - J)F(K)/(1 + r*)
+ J(l + M*)y F(K*)/(1 + r*) - JW*M M*/(l + r*)
= cl(W,q) + c2(W,q)/(l + r*) + G1
+ G2/(l + r*> + (N - J)K + JK*. (13")
Then, the other seven control variables--FDI, V, r, r, r*M, f*, 0--are
determined by the following constraints: (21), (1"), (9"a), (9"b), (9"c),
(11), and the first-period resource constraint:
FDI = JK* + (N - J)K - [I1 - c1(W,q) - G1] . (12")
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The Langragian expression is given by
L = v(W,q) + A[I1 + I2/(l + r*) + (N - J)F(K)/(1 + r*)
+ J(l + M*) y F(K*)/(1 + r ) - Jw*M M*/(l + r*)
- cl(W,q) - G1 - c2(W,q)/(l + r*) - G2/(l + r*)
- (N - J)K - JK*]. (14")
The first-order conditions establish the familiar aggregate production
efficiency results:
(1 + M*) y F' (K*) = 1 + r* , (15"a)
y(1 + M*)y-1F(K*) = w*M , (15-b)
and
F'(K) + 1 + r*. (15"c)
In addition, differentiating L with respect to J and setting the
derivative equal to zero yields
(1 + M*)y F(K*) - w*M M* - (1 + r*)K*
- F(K) - (1 + r*)K.
This proves (25) .
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